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Whenever suit is brought in a federal court to challenge the consti-
tutionality or validity of governmental action, the initial response of the
government is, almost invariably, "The Court should not hear this
case." Several arguments are frequently used. If a state law or action
of a state official is challenged, the state will argue that the suit should
have been brought in state court' and that the federal court should
"abstain" pending a state court determination of state law.2 When ad-
ministrative action is challenged, the principal defenses are failure to
exhaust administrative remedies and nonreviewability of the action. If
the plaintiff has not yet suffered a demonstrable injury, it will be
claimed that the case is not "ripe"; if the injury has already occurred,
the question of mootness comes into play.3 But the argument that has
been foremost among the defenses raised by the government in an effort
to avoid a determination on the merits is that the plaintiff lacks stand-
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. A.B. 1956, J.D. 1959, University of Pittsburgh.
The invaluable assistance of Richard N. Rose, a third-year student in the College of Law, is
gratefully acknowledged.
I. For a discussion regarding the desirability of challenging state laws or governmental
action in the federal courts rather than in the state courts see Sedler, The Dombrowski-Type Suit
As An Effective Weapon for Social Change: Reflections from Without and Within, 18 KAN. L.
REv. 237, 254-55 (1970).
2. The most clearly established usage of the "abstention doctrine" justifies a stay of federal
court action only when state action is being challenged as contrary to the United States Constitu-
tion and there are unsettled questions of state law that may preclude the necessity of reaching the
federal question. The doctrine is severely limited, and it does not give state courts the sole "privi-
lege" of declaring state laws unconstitutional. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1967).
See generally' C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 196-208 (2d ed. 1970).
3. See generally North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 1008 (1971); C. WRIGHT, supra note 2,
at 35-36.
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ing.4 Litigation over standing has indeed been extensive.5 Moreover, it
has been commonplace to refer to standing as a "complicated speciality
of federal jurisdiction,"6 and it does seem that courts and commentators
have sometimes gone out of their way to make the matter as complex
as possible.
Standing, of course, is but one component of the broader question
of justiciability: should federal judicial power be employed to hear this
challenge by this litigant at this time? As the Supreme Court has ob-
served, justiciability is "a concept of uncertain meaning and scope,' '
7
and it has become a "blend of constitutional requirements and policy
considerations" that are not always distinguishable. 8 This concept in-
cludes not only standing but also ripeness, mootness, political question,
reviewability of administrative actions, and, generally, any question re-
lating to whether federal judicial power is properly exercisable in a
particular case It is possible to separate analytically standing from the
other components of justiciability, as courts and commentators often
have done. Yet it is difficult to believe that a judge deciding whether to
hear a constitutional or administrative challenge always draws fine dis-
'tinctions between these components. It is perhaps more reasonable to
conclude that frequently the judge takes more of a "Gestalt approach,"
and that his real concern is simply whether he should hear the case on
the merits. 0 This may explain why courts strain to find standing and to
navigate the other hurdles to judicial review in some cases but not in
others." Furthermore, it is difficult to ignore the merits of the case,
4. E.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
5. This article deals primarily with standing to sue in federal court. Standing to challenge
governmental action on particular grounds is a related question treated in Sedler, Standing To
Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962). The standing
requirement also is applicable to cases coming to the Supreme Court from the state courts. If the
plaintiff lacked standing under federal law concepts, the Supreme Court would decline review
despite the existence of standing under state law. Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
6. United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953).
7. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968).
8. Id. at 95.
9. For a discussion regarding the relationship of standing to the constitutional requirement
of case or controversy see id. at 94-95, 100-01. Although the case or controversy requirement has
little independent significance as a limitation on judicial review, its underlying rationale has shaped
the development of many components of justiciability.
10. 1 have been involved as counsel in a number of cases challenging the constitutionality of
laws and other governmental action, and many of my views have been shaped by that experience.
See Sedler, supra note I, at 239.
I1. In Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F.2d 833 (6th Cir. 1971), one of my own cases that
involved a challenge to the constitutionality of Kentucky's anti-abortion law, I included as plaintiffs
a physician, a pregnant married woman who wanted an abortion, a married woman who did not
want to become pregnant, a minister, and a local women's rights group. The District Judge
[Vol. 25
STANDING AND JUSTICIABILITY
particularly when the denial of standing may be an effective denial of
the underlying claim itself.'
2
As the above observation suggests, my orientation is toward the
behavior of courts when confronted with questions of standing and justi-
ciability. If law is, as Justice Holmes reminded us many years ago, no
more than "prophecies of what the courts will do in fact,"' 13 a behav-
ioral analysis may have a great deal of utility not only for the practi-
tioner but also for the academic commentator. By looking at the way
courts deal with actual cases, the legal community may assess to what
extent the concept of standing has been significant in determining ques-
tions of justiciability and in limiting judicial review of governmental
action. At a minimum, this kind of analysis provides a more realistic
setting for examining the relevance of doctrinal refinements. Therefore,
in an attempt to describe the concept of standing as an independent
limitation on judicial review, this article will emphasize the kinds of
questions about standing and justiciability that do arise, how they have
been dealt with by the courts, and what generalizations we may draw
from this judicial behavior.'4
II. THE LAW OF STANDING As ENUNCIATED BY THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court's decisions on questions of standing and the
principles it has enunciated constitute the frame of reference within
which lower federal courts must approach the problem. In the view of
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, "Four Supreme Court cases, two in
1968 and two in 1970, have drastically liberalized the federal law of
standing, giving it a new basic orientation."'' 5 The practical effect of
these decisions, as will be demonstrated, is that in most cases standing
dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction because it did not present a case or controversy. He
also refused to certify the necessity for the convention of 3-judge court. In his bench opinion,
however, he made a number of other points, which demonstrated his view that the anti-abortion
law should not be challenged in an affirmative suit. The Sixth 1ircuit reversed, holding that a case
or controversy was presented. "[I]n the interest of judicial economy" it also determined that the
physician and pregnant woman had standing, that the married woman and organizational plaintiff
lacked standing, and that the standing of the minister would have to be determined by a 3-judge
court.
12. See Lewis, Constitutional Rights and the Misuse of "Standing," 14 STAN. L. REv. 433
(1962).
13. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
14. There is a problem in determining judicial behavior by looking only to reported cases,
since the opinions in many cases decided at the district court level are unreported. A variance
between judicial behavior reflected in reported decisions and that reflected in the unreported ones
is indeed possible. See Sedler, supra note I, at 261. Although I present this caveat, I do not think
the variance is too significant in the areas of standing and justiciability.
15. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHi. L. REV. 450 (1970).
1972]
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is no longer an obstacle to judicial action in federal courts. In policy
terms, the new decisions represent a value judgment-and in this sense
a command to lower federal courts-that standing should be liberalized
and federal judicial review of governmental action broadened.
It first is necessary to consider briefly two of the discernable princi-
ples that existed in the Supreme Court law of standing as it existed prior
to 1968. The first was that, although state and municipal taxpayers had
standing to challenge the validity of actual expenditures undertaken by
those governmental units, 6 Frothingham v. Mellon,'7 decided in 1923,
appeared to be a conclusive bar to similar actions by federal taxpayers
challenging the validity of federal expenditures. The second was that,
apart from taxpayer's suits, a plaintiff was required to demonstrate
injury to a "legal right." For example, since there was no legal right to
be free from competition by government instrumentalities, the Court
refused to allow private power companies to challenge the constitution-
ality of the Tennessee Valley Authority.'8 Lower federal courts con-
strued this holding as a prohibition of suits challenging governmental
action on the ground that it would benefit a competitor.' 9 To satisfy the
-requirement of demQnstrable injury the plaintiff had to show immediacy
of harm. Thus, a government employee who wanted to engage in politi-
cal activity despite the Hatch Act's proscription was held not to have
standing to challenge its constitutionality, unless he actually had vio-
lated the Act.
20
The thrust of these guidelines was to make standing a potential
issue in any case in which the plaintiff affirmatively sought judicial
review of governmental action. He could not proceed merely as a tax-
payer or concerned citizen, but rather had to show both legal injury to
himself,21 as a result of the challenged governmental action, and an
injury that was direct rather than speculative. 22 While the plaintiff fre-
16. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899);
Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601 (1880).
17. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
18. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939); cf Joint Anti-Facist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). See also Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113
(1940).
19. See, e.g., Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955). But see FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940)
(basing standing on review provisions of Federal Communications Act).
20. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
21. When the plaintiff had no standing to sue in his own right, he generally could not assert
a jus terti! claim. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943). For a discussion of standing to assert a
jus tertii claim see Sedler, supra note 5, at 646-48.
22. E.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (nonenforcement of challenged statute held to
preclude finding of injury); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
[Vol. 25
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quently could surmount these obstacles, a number of suits were dis-
missed for lack of standing, and, to that extent, the concept operated
as an important limitation upon the availability of judicial review. I
The first of the four liberalizing suits, Flast v. Cohen,24 involved a
taxpayer's challenge to the constitutionality of federal aid to parochial
schools. The Court held that Frothingham was not an absolute constitu-
tional bar to taxpayer suits against the federal government, and that a
federal taxpayer had the necessary "personal stake" to satisfy the case
and controversy requirement of article III when the challenge to federal
expenditures was based upon a specific constitutional limitation such as
that contained in the first amendment's establishment clause.25 It distin-
guished Frothingham on the ground that the plaintiff there did not
allege that Congress had breached a specific limitation upon its taxing
and spending power but merely that it had exceeded the general powers
delegated to it by article I, section 8 and thereby had invaded the legisla-
tive province reserved to the states by the tenth amendment.
26
In Flast the Court developed a nexus principle of standing that is
more important than the decision, which only partially opened the door
to taxpayer's suits. The Court stated this principle as follows:
The various rules of standing applied by federal courts have not been devel-
oped in the abstract. Rather, they have been fashioned with specific reference to
the status asserted by the party whose standing is challenged and to the type of
question he wishes to have adjudicated. We have noted that, in deciding the ques-
tion of standing it is not relevant that the substantive issues in the litigation might
be nonjusticiable. However, our decisions establish that, in ruling on standing, it is
both appropriate and necessary to look to the substantive issues for another pur-
pose, namely, to determine whether there is a logical nexus between the status
asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated.27
This rationale necessarily goes far to liberalize standing by enabling
courts to focus on the status of the plaintiff and the substantive ground
of his attack as the basis for standing. Thus Flast allowed standing to
23. See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 39-43.
24. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
25. The Court viewed the case and controversy requirement of article III as relating to
standing only insofar as it necessitated presentation of the dispute in an adversary context and in
a form appropriate for judicial resolution. Id. at 101. Since in this context article III did not
constitute an absolute bar against suits by federal taxpayers, t was necessary for the Court to
determine whether the plaintiff had the "personal stake and interest [to] impart the necessary
concrete adverseness to such litigation. ... Id.
26. For a critical view of this distinction see Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U.
Cm. L. REv. 601, 608-11 (1968).
27. 392 U.S. at 101-02 (emphasis added).
1972]
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one who did not suffer any tangible injury 8 but who, because of his
status as a taxpayer and citizen, could challenge an expenditure as
violative of the first amendment. Whether the result is explained by
saying that he still suffered injury to a legal interest or that an appropri-
ate nexus between the plaintiff's status and the right asserted obviates
this requirement makes no real difference. In practice, the Court shifted
the operational test of standing from a legal injury concept to a nexus
concept.
The Court in 1968 also modified previous law with regard to ac-
tions to protect a competitive interest.29 In Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities
Co.,3 it held that a party could challenge the validity of governmental
action that served to benefit a competitor, at least when the law relied
on as the basis for the challenge was designed to prevent improper
competition. Plaintiffs were utility companies who contended that the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was not .authorized to expand its
sales into their service area. The Court acknowledged that plaintiffs had
standing, although it held against them on the merits. It distinguished
previous cases on the ground that "the statutory and constitutional
requirements [asserted] were in no way concerned with protecting
against competitive injury. '31 Since an obvious purpose of the enabling
statute's area limitations was to protect private utilities from TVA com-
petition, the Court held that the plaintiffs had standing to contend that
TVA was not authorized to enter their areas.3 While the proposition
that parties whose interests are protected by statute have standing to
obtain such protection may be "almost too obvious to state,' 3 the
case is very significant from a behavioral standpoint because the Court
expressly held that a competitive interest alone could confer standing.
This holding discredited a leading lower court case 4 that had been
relied on by many other courts to deny standing automatically when the
plaintiff sought to protect such an interest.
31
Liberalization of the law regarding a competitor's standing was
28. Ordinarily it cannot be contended that any taxpayer suffers tangible injury from a
particular expenditure, because its impact upon his tax liability is infinitesimal. Although expendi-
tures for waging the Vietnam War may be an exception to this observation, it would be difficult
to think of any other.
29. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
30. 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
31. Id. at 6.
32. The Court also held that an explicit statutory provision authorizing competitors' suits
was unnecessary when plaintiff was within the class the statute was designed to protect. Id. at 7.
33. Davis, supra note 15, at 451.
34. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
35. See Davis, supra note 15, at 451-52.
[Vol. 25
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completed in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v.
Camp26 In Data Processing plaintiffs had instituted an action against
both the Comptroller of the Currency and a national bank, challenging
a ruling by the Comptroller that allowed national banks to provide data
processing services to bank customers and other banks. In reversing a
dismissal for lack of standing, the Supreme Court buried the legal inter-
est test as going to the merits rather than to the question of standing.
It then formulated a two-pronged test for standing: (1) did the chal-
lenged action cause the plaintiff injury in fact, economic or otherwise?
(2) was the interest sought to be protected by the plaintiff arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute
or constitutional guarantee in question? 37 The Court found that the
plaintiffs would be injured in fact by competition from national banks
in the data processing field and that the statute relied on to invalidate
the Comptroller's action,38 which was designed to limit the activities of
national banks, "arguably [brought] a competitor within the zone of
interests protected by it.
' '31
The Court applied this two-pronged test in Barlow v. Collin0 to
allow tenant farmers who were eligible for federal agricultural subsidies
to challenge an action of the Secretary of Agriculture permitting assign-
ment of these benefits to secure crop rent for farmland. Under the
former regulation, benefits could be assigned only as security for ad-
vances that would enable the recipients to make a crop. The plaintiffs
contended that landlords would rely on the new regulation to demand
advance assignment of the federal benefits as a condition to obtaining
a lease, thereby making the plaintiffs dependent upon the landlord for
supplies. This was obviously an allegation of injury in fact, and the
Court found "implicit in the statutory provisions and their legislative
history . . . a congressional intent that the Secretary protect the inter-
ests of tenant farmers."4' Therefore, the plaintiffs were held to be within
the zone of interests protected by the Act.
Justices Brennan and White filed a separate opinion covering both
Data Processing and Barlow in which they contended that the only test
of standing should be injury in fact. The zone of interests test, they
argued, "comes very close to perpetuating the discredited requirement
36. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
37. Id. at 152-53. The Court did not indicate that it was laying down a separate test for
standing to seek review of administrative action.
38. Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962, 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1970).
39. 397 U.S. at 156.
40. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
41. Id. at 164.
19721
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
that conditioned standing on a showing by the plaintiff that the chal-
lenged governmental action invaded one of his legally protected inter-
ests. '42 They also contended that any canvass of the relevant statute
should be used only to determine reviewability, a matter entirely sepa-
rate from standing. Finally, they warned "[I]n making such examina-
tion of statutory materials an element in the determination of standing,
the Court not only performs a useless and unnecessary exercise but also
encourages badly reasoned decisions, which may well deny justice in this
complex field." '4
3
Professor Davis has said that the difference between the majority
approach and the Brennan-White approach-whether injury in fact
should be the sole basis for standing-is a "live issue."44 The issue,
however, is not as "live" as Professor Davis suggests. When the plaintiff
is challenging governmental action on constitutional grounds, he neces-
sarily is asserting that his interest is protected by the constitutional
guarantee upon which he is relying. Any further inquiry goes to the
merits. In the area of judicial review of administrative action, the differ-
ence in approach conceivably could bring about a different result, but
only if the courts would employ the zone of interests test to deny
standing to one who has been injured in fact. In practice they have not
done so, and there appears to have been no reported case in which a
court finding injury in fact has not also found that the plaintiff's claim
was arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated.
The Supreme Court's decision last term in Investment Company
Institute v. Camp,45 bears out this view, and, as a practical matter, may
render the zone of interests test functionally irrelevant. The plaintiffs,
open-ended investment companies and an association of securities deal-
ers, brought an action under the Glass-Stegall Banking Act of 193346
challenging regulations promulgated by the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency and an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission, each
of which allowed national banks to operate mutual investment funds.
The Court simply held that any contention about lack of standing was
foreclosed by Data Processing, since the plaintiffs faced the same injury
from new competition and since "Congress had arguably legislated
42. Id. at 168.
43. Id. at 170.
44. Davis, supra note 15, at 457-58. Professor Davis strongly criticizes the majority approach
as "(1) analytically faulty, (2) contrary to much case law the Court should not have intended to
overrule, (3) cumbersome, inconvenient, and artificial, and (4) at variance with the dominant intent
behind the Administrative Procedure Act." Id. at 457-58.
45. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
46. Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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against the competition that the petitioners sought to challenge, and
from which flowed their injury."4 The Court's failure to make an inde-
pendent inquiry regarding the zone of interests requirement indicates
that a plausible claim that is not clearly insubstantial would be sufficient
to satisfy the second prong of the Data Processing test.',
In summarizing the effect of the Supreme Court's recent decisions
on standing, we can say first that in actions to protect a private interest
49
the test of injury to legal interest has been replaced by injury in fact;
and it is doubtful whether the zone of interests aspect of Data Processing
has any real significance.5 0 Moreover, Flast, by recognizing a federal
taxpayer's suit, has opened the door to further development of actions
motivated by the desire to protect a public interest.5' Yet combination
of the nexus test of standing promulgated in Flast, with the injury in
fact basis of standing in Data Processing, should have a liberalizing
effect that goes beyond the holding in either case and that can be partic-
ularly important in the public interest area. The plaintiff's status in
relation to the issue he is raising may itself support a finding of injury
in fact, depending on how "substantial" that injury must be.52 For exam-
ple, in Data Processing the Court emphasized the fact that a protected
interest may reflect "'aesthetic, conservational and recreational,' as
well as economic values";" subsequent cases have held that a resident
of an area threatened by environmental damage due to governmental
action has standing because of that status to challenge such action as
detrimental to his environment. 4
The liberalization of standing is reflective of the Supreme Court's
47. 401 U.S. at 620. For a detailed discussion of the Court's opinion see Comment, Judicial
Review ofAgency Action: The Unsettled Law of Standing, 69 MIcn. L. REv. 540, 564-68 (1971).
48. See also Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970) (travel agents held to have
standing to challenge an order of the Comptroller authorizing national banks to engage in travel
agency business).
49, This type of litigation will be referred to throughout the remainder of the article as a
"private action." See text accompanying note 59 infra.
50. As the subsequent discussion will indicate, the zone of interests test has not been used
to deny standing to any plaintiff who has shown injury in fact.
51. This type of litigation will be referred to throughout the remainder of the article as a
"public action." See text accompanying note 60 infra.
52. For the view that a "trifling interest" should suffice, and is required, see Davis, supra
note 26, at 611-17. See also North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244 (1971); Brockingham v. Rhodes,
396 U.S. 41 (1969).
53. 397 U.S. at 154.
54. See notes 183-90 infra and accompanying text. In Sierra Club v. Morton, 40 U.S.L.W.
4397 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1972), the Supreme Court, while holding that a conservation organization did
not have standing to bring a public action to protect the environment, appeared to recognize that
persons who used a recreational area would have standing to challenge governmental action which
would interfere with such use.
1972]
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general liberalization of justiciability in recent years. This development
has been particularly evident in several areas. The "political question"
limitation upon judicial review, for example, was severely narrowed by
the Court's decisions in Baker v. Car-5 and Powell v. McCormick.5
6
Likewise, the Court increasingly has rejected claims of mootness57 and
nonreviewability of administrative action. 8 Because of this increase in
judicial activism and because judicial protection of constitutional and
other federal rights has become more visible, levels of consciousness
have been raised, and people have become more encouraged to resort
to the courts. The courts are now seen by many as imposing restraints
on governmental action that previously could not be challenged. More
people are coming into court-and for our purposes this means the
federal courts-to raise more issues, thereby more frequently forcing
the court to confront the question "should we hear the case."
III. STANDING OF INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS
These plaintiffs may be classified in terms of gradations relating
primarily to their motivation. At one end of the scale there is the plain-
tiff who does not differ from the ordinary plaintiff in a civil suit, not-
withstanding the fact that he is seeking to challenge governmental action
or to review an administrative determination. His suit may be described
as a "private action"59 because the essential motivation in bringing it is
to protect his private interest, usually an economic one. At the other end
of the scale is what Professor Jaffe has called the "non-Hohfeldian" or
"ideological plaintiff."6 His suit may be described as a "public action"
because the purpose in bringing it is to challenge governmental action
that he considers contrary both to the general good and to the values in
which he believes. Most likely he is the "front person" for a group
challenge, and the suit will be backed by group resources. Between the
55. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (legislative apportionment held reviewable under equal protection
clause).
56. 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (exclusion of elected representative by House of Representatives
held invalid).
57. E.g., Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969) (mootness defense rejected when claim
reflects a "continuing controversy capable of repetition yet evading review"); Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40 (1968) (criminal conviction held not to become moot by virtue of expiration of
sentence).
58. E.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 166 (1970).
59. Although this term has also been used by Professor Jaffe, it is used in a somewhat
different sense here. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 459-60 (1965).
60. Jaffe, The Citizen As Litigant in Public Actions: The NonHohfeldian or Ideological
Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968).
[Vol. 25
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positions of these two plaintiffs on the ideological spectrum is the person
who suffers a specific injury from the challenged action, but whose
motivation extends beyond that injury and relates to the values and
policies he seeks to promote. Although it is truly Procrustean to deal
similarly with the standing of these different categories of plaintiffs,
ranging from the purely private to the purely ideological, in theory the
same test is to be applied to each.
In discussing the standing of the three types of plaintiffs no differ-
entiation will be made between cases in which the plaintiff is challenging
the validity of a law or other governmental action and those in which
he is seeking judicial review of federal administrative action. Although
it has been argued that section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act6
has broadened standing to seek review of administrative action,62 the
predominant view has been that the section was merely "declaratory of
existing law." 3 More importantly, cases dealing with challenges to
governmental action and review of administrative action have been cited
and relied on interchangeably, and there does not appear to have been
any difference in result depending on the kind of case involved.
A. Private Actions
In the private action it is assumed by all concerned that the plain-
tiff's standing depends upon his ability to demonstrate injury to his
private interest, although he also may have a broader concern. Since it
appears that the zone of interests test of Data Processing no longer has
any independent significance, the current law of standing in private
actions can be determined by examining the willingness of the courts to
find an injury in fact in the various types of cases.
1. Competitor's Standing.-As pointed out previously, Hardin
and Data Processing established standing to challenge governmental
action that benefits a competitor, at least when the purpose of the
substantive claim is to achieve freedom from unauthorized competition.
The Supreme Court's recent holding in Investment Company Institute
v. Camp," and its per curiam decision in Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp,65
make it clear that recognition of such standing is now a routine matter."
61. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
62. See Davis, supra note 15, at 465-68.
63. L. JAFFE, supra note 59, at 528-31.
64. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
65. 400 U.S. 45 (1970).
66. After Data Processing, it has become sufficient to relegate the competitor's standing
question to a footnote. See Ramapo Bank v. Camp, 425 F.2d 333, 345 n.33 (3d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970). See also Lodge 1858, Am. Fed'n Gov't Employees v. Paine, 436 F.2d
1972]
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Actually, a number of lower court decisions recognized standing on this
basis in the years immediately preceding Data Processing.7
In Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer,"8 which was decided
shortly before Data Processing, the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals held that an unsuccessful bidder on a government contract had
standing to challenge the validity of the Federal Aviation Agency's
(FAA) action in awarding the contract to another. The FAA had sought
bids for instrument landing systems, and the plaintiff's bid was second
lowest. The plaintiff contended that since the lower bid did not comply
with the invitation for bids, as required by federal regulations, the action
of the FAA in awarding the bid was "arbitrary, capricious and a viola-
tion of the statutory provisions governing contracting ... ."" In hold-
ing that the plaintiff had standing, the court applied the nexus test of
Flast. It found that plaintiff had suffered injury in fact and that there
was a nexus between his status as an unsuccessful bidder and his claim
that the agency had violated federal regulations in awarding the bid to
another. The court also found that the awarding of bids was not a matter
"committed to agency discretion," which would have made it unreview-
able under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
70
After Data Processing, it is clear that the Scanwell decision was
"correct" insofar as an unsuccessful bidder's standing to challenge an
agency's compliance with applicable regulations in awarding contract,
is concerned.7' The only remaining problem is the scope of agency dis-
882 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (civil service employees held to have standing to challenge implementation
of work force at federal installations through service support contracts).
67. See Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 420 F.2d 577 (D.C.
Cir. 1969); Safir v. Gibson, 417 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); Public
Serv. Co. v. Hamil, 416 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1010 (1970); Matson
Navigation Co. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 405 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1968); Mid-West Nat'l Bank
v. Comptroller of the Currency, 296 F.Supp. 1223 (N.D. I11. 1968); Stephens v. Dennis, 293 F.
Supp. 589 (N.D. Ala. 1968); State Chartered Banks v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 291 F. Supp. 180 (W.D.
Wash. 1966). Contra, South Suburban Safeway Lines, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 416 F.2d 535 (7th
Cir. 1969) (the court found, however, that the challenged action was valid); cf. Wilson v. Watson,
309 F. Supp. 263 (D. Kan. 1968), affd sub nom., Wilson v. Blount, 422 F.2d 866 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 865 (1970).
68. 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
69. Id. at 861.
70. Id. at 874-75.
71. See Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970), petition for cert. dismissed, 401 U.S.
950 (1971). In Allen M. Campbell Gen'l Contractors, Inc. v. Lloyd Wood Constr. Co., 446 F.2d
261 (5th Cir. 1971), the court was not certain that bidders' standing was fully established, but found
that plaintiff's standing to make the particular challenge was authorized specifically by the agency's
regulations. In Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1233 (Ct. Cl. 1970), the court held
that the unsuccessful bidder was entitled to recover bid preparation costs if it established that there
had been a violation of the bidding regulations.
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cretion. In Hi-Ridge Lumber Co. v. United States,72 for example, the
Ninth Circuit Court of appeals recently held that a decision by the
Secretary of Agriculture rejecting all bids for the purchase of timber in
a national forest constituted action "committed to agency discretion"
and thereby foreclosed judicial review.
73
2. Potential Economic Injury As a Basis for Standing. -Before
Data Processing the standing of a plaintiff to challenge the validity of
governmental action that had caused him demonstrable economic injury
was well settled. 74 Prospective injury was also a sufficient ground for
recognition of standing when it necessarily would follow from the gov-
ernmental action being challenged. 75 Data Processing, however, had
made it clear that there is standing to challenge all governmental action
that can have an adverse effect on economic activity. Therefore, it is no
longer necessary for the plaintiff to show present or immediate eco-
nomic loss. As the District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently
observed in a case involving pre-enforcement review of a Department
of Labor decision under the Fair Labor Standards Act "The Supreme
Court's recent decisions have made the standing obstacle to judicial
review a shadow of its former self, and have for all practical purposes
deprived it of meaningful vitality. ' 76 This observation has been borne
out in a series of post-Data Processing decisions.
77
72. 443 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1971).
73. The court focused on the numerous types of discretion contained in the statute and also
noted that the Forest Service was specifically authorized to reject all bids with or without reason.
74. E.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (because book sales had
declined, paperback book publishers had standing to challenge action of law enforcement officers
warning distributors of possible criminal prosecution. But cf Linda S. v. Richard D., 335 F. Supp.
804 (ND. Tex. 1971) (mother of illegitimate child held to lack standing to challenge the constitu-
tionality of a state law limiting the imposition of criminal penalties for nonsupport to fathers of
legitimate children).
75. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (drug manufacturers had
standing to challenge new administrative regulations before enforcement had begun); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (private school could challenge the constitutionality of a
state law prohibiting attendance at private schools that was to take effect in 2 years because, in
light of the statute, parents had begun to withdraw their children from the school); Aircraft Owners
& Pilots Ass'n v. Port Authority, 305 F. Supp. 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (aircraft owners and pilots
had standing to challenge imposition of take-off fee on general aviation planes during peak traffic
hours).
76. National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Schultz, 443 F.2d 689, 693 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
77. See P.A.M. News Corp. v. Hardin, 440 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (operators of agricul-
tural data news wire service had standing under the first amendment to challenge competition by
Department of Agriculture); Armco Steel Corp. v. Stans, 431 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1970) (domestic
steel producer allowed to seek review of a decision of the Foreign-Trade Zones Board granting
port commissioners the right to create a foreign trade subzone in which vessels were to be built
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Standing still may be denied in a private action, however, if the
plaintiff cannot establish any likelihood of injury from the action he is
challenging. In Granite Falls State Bank v. Schneider,78 a state bank
that maintained 286,000 dollars of reserves was held not to have stand-
ing to challenge a state law requiring a minimum banking reserve of
86,000 dollars. The court observed that the plaintiff had not suffered a
present injury, and there was no evidence that future damage might be
incurred.
It also should be noted that a plaintiff still can be barred by other
justiciability doctrines such as nonreviewability of administrative ac-
tion, or ripeness for judicial review; but this has been fairly rare.79 The
plaintiff who claims present or prospective economic loss due to govern-
mental action usually will be able to challenge its validity.
3. Challenges to Allocation of Governmental Benefits.-Barlow
v. Collins involved standing to challenge governmental action affecting
the new property" represented by governmental benefits. Such standing
was recognized prior to Barlow, and is now beyond dispute. The status
of plaintiffs as persons eligible for government benefits, for example,
gives them standing to challenge the way these programs are adminis-
tered"' or the failure of the programs to provide benefits.8" Likewise,
with duty-free imported steel); Harry H. Price & Sons, Inc. v. Hardin, 425 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir.
1970) (tomato wholesaler had standing to challenge Secretary of Agriculture's regulation restrict-
ing importation of tomatoes from Mexico); Sam Andrews' Sons v. Mitchell, 326 F. Supp. 35 (S.D.
Cal. 1971) (grower relying on work force composed of Mexican "green card commuters" had
standing to challenge regulation prohibiting such workers from accepting employment at a place
where a labor dispute existed).
78. 319 F. Supp. 1346 (W.D. Wash. 1970), affd mem.. 402 U.S. 1006 (1971).
79. For one instance when the doctrine of ripeness was invoked, however, see P.A.M. News
Corp. v. Hardin, 440 F.2d 255, 257 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
80. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
81. See Peoples v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 427 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Essex
County Welfare Bd. v. Cohen, 299 F. Supp. 176 (D.N.J. 1969).
82. Alexander v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971) (minors who lost AFDC benefits as a result
of attending college were allowed to challenge the constitutionality of a rule allowing AFDC
benefits to minors between the ages of 18 and 21 only if they were attending high school or
vocational training schools); Tucker v. Hardin, 430 F.2d 737 (Ist Cir. 1970) (indigent women who
were eligible for surplus commodities but who were residents of communities not receiving com-
modities because no funds had been provided for local distribution costs, had standing to challenge
rule of Secretary of Agriculture requiring local communities to pay such costs as a condition to
receipt of surplus commodities); Sparrow v. Gill, 304 F. Supp. 86 (M.D.N.C. 1969) (residents of
affected area permitted to challenge denial of state-provided school bus transportation). But see
Carlsbad Union School Dist. v. Rafferty, 300 F. Supp. 434 (S.D. Cal. 1969), aff d, 429 F.2d 337
(9th Cir. 1970), and Triplett v. Tiemann, 302 F. Supp. 1239 (D. Neb. 1969), in which it was held
that residents of a school district did not have standing to challenge on equal protection grounds
state laws which provided for the deduction of certain percentages of federal impacted area funds
from the amount of state aid that otherwise would have been allocated by the state to the impacted
school districts.
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prior to Barlow, it was held that residents who were displaced by an
urban renewal program had standing to challenge the failure of urban
renewal officials to provide for adequate relocation.8 3 The same was
true with respect to violations of the relocation provisions of the Federal
Highway Act.84 Moreover, in Shannon v. Hud,85 decided after Barlow,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that all persons in an urban
renewal area who would be affected by the development pro-
gram-residents, businessmen, and civic organizations-had standing
to challenge the urban renewal plan as violative of federal statutes.
8
1
Furthermore, in the recent case of Northwest Residents Association v.
HUD, 87 property owners in an area affected by HUD activity-property
appraisals and approval of building applications-were held to have
standing to challenge these actions as violative of the 1968 Housing and
Urban Development Act.88
In this area, however, nonreviewability of administrative action can
be particularly important. Two circuits recently have held, for example,
that approval of rents and charges in federally subsidized low-and
m'oderate-income housing is a matter committed to agency discretion
under the Administrative Procedure Act,89 thereby barring judicial re-
view.
4. Other Private Interests.-We may now consider some other
situations in which the plaintiff seeks to protect essentially private inter-
ests. A property owner can challenge governmental action that would
make his property less valuable."0 Moreover, a plaintiff suing a local
83. The leading case is Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920
(2d Cir. 1968). See also Aarrington v. City of Fairfield, 414 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1969); Hanley v.
Volpe, 305 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
84. See Nashville 1-40 Steering Comm. v. Ellington, 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968); Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie, 314 F. Supp. 20 (S.D.W.
Va. 1969), affd, 429 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1970), petition for cert. dismissed, 402 U.S. 497 (1971).
85. 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
86. See also Coalition for United Community Action v. Romney, 316 F. Supp. 742 (N.D.
III. 1970) (organizations representing residents in model cities areas had standing to challenge the
failure of the Secretary to determine that the proposed model cities program satisfied the statutory
criteria). Contra, Benson v. City of Minneapolis, 286 F. Supp. 614 (D. Minn. 1968) (resident of a
proposed model cities area held to lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute).
87. 325 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
88. 12 U.S.C. § 1701t (1970). The court had some difficulty with the second prong of the
Data Processing test, but found that the statutory policy of guaranteeing a "decent home and
suitable living environment for every American family" was sufficient. Id.
89. Langevin v. Chenago Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971); Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430
F.2d 1243 (Ist Cir. 1970).
90. L'Enfant Plaza N., Inc., v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 300 F.
Supp. 426 (D.D.C. 1969) (urban renewal plan that would have established similar and competitive
buildings). See also The Bootery, Inc. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 326
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governmental agency has been allowed to question the legitimacy of that
agency's use of federal funds to defray expenses incurred in the defense
of his suit." In addition, the Supreme Court has held that a person
falsely accused of a criminal offense by a state commission has standing
to litigate its constitutionality.2
Of course, the plaintiffs claim may be denied on the basis of other
justiciability considerations. A plaintiff will not, for example, be allowed
to challenge the application of a statute to a set of hypothetical or
abstract facts.13 Likewise, a litigant may be denied standing to seek
relief if his claim is not ripe for judicial determination. 4 Furthermore,
courts probably will continue to deny review when a private claim be-
comes moot. 5
B. The "Private-Public Action" Standing To Protect Freedom of
Expression
It obviously is not possible to draw a neat dichotomy between
private and public actions. Motivation is often a very mixed thing. In
bridging the gap between the private and the public action, it may be
useful to consider the problem of standing to protect first amendment
freedom of expression. Here the plaintiff necessarily is concerned with
the public interest in freedom of expression, but his concern is related
to the kind of expression that he wants the public to hear.
The "public nature" of any first amendment claim in relation to
the standing of the particular plaintiff who is asserting it was recognized
in Mandel v. Mitchell,6 which held that university professors who in-
vited an alien to speak on campus had standing to challenge the consti-
tutionality of a statute excluding him. The court observed that "[t]he
special relation of plaintiffs to Mandel's projected visit gives them a
specificity of interest in his admission, reinforced by the general public
interest in the prevention of any stifling of political utterance, that
F. Supp. 794 (D.D.C. 1971) (leaseholding business operators who would be dislocated by mass
transit plan had standing to challenge validity of the plan).
91. West Coast Constr. Co. v. Oceans Sanitary Dist., 311 F. Supp. 378 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
92. Jenkins v. McKeithan, 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
93. See, e.g., King v. McCaffrey, 321 F. Supp. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
94. See, e.g., Bowes v. Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption, 330 F.
Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (suit to enjoin commission from compelling appearance of plaintiffs
on the ground that their assertion of privilege against self-incrimination before commission would
lead to their discharge).
95. E.g., Heumann v. Board of Educ., 320 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (teacher's claim
of unconstitutional denial of license because she was confined to a wheelchair mooted when she
obtained relief on administrative appeal).
96. 325 F. Supp. 620 (E.D.N.Y. 197 1)prob. juris. noted, 92 S.Ct. 67.
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abundantly satisfies 'standing' requirements."9 Nevertheless, a plain-
tiffs standing depends upon a showing that his first amendment rights
have been abridged by governmental action; the substantive basis of his
challenge serves to protect the public interest in freedom of expression..9 ,
As a practical matter, affirmative actions to protect freedom of
expression were fairly rare prior to the Supreme Court's 1965 decision
in Dombrowski v. Pfister.1 This may have been due largely to the
restrictive notion of standing enunciated in United Public Workers v.
Mitchell,'® which seemed to say that a person could not challenge a
statute on the ground that it deprived him of first amendment rights
unless he actually had violated its prohibitions. In Dombrowski the
Supreme Court recognized that the threatened enforcement of a facially
invalid law regulating or applicable to acts of expression could have a
chilling effect on the exercise of first amendment rights, and on that
basis it enjoined future enforcement of the Louisiana subversive activi-
ties statute. The "Dombrowski-type suit"' has received the greatest
attention in connection with injunctions against pending criminal prose-
cutions in state courts-a function that was considerably limited by the
Supreme Court's recent decisions in Younger v. Harris'2 and related
cases. 13 It is equally applicable, however, to actions seeking to enjoin
future federal and state law enforcement or other threatened govern-
mental action.'"' In this regard Dombrowski broadened the notion of
"irreparable injury"'015 and, at the same time, necessarily liberalized
standing to assert a violation of first amendment rights.0 6
From this perspective, Dombrowski must be viewed as an impor-
97. Id. at 632.
98. For a discussion regarding the different functions of the constitutional guarantee see
Sedler, Review: The First Amendment in Theory and Practice, 80 YALE L.J. 1070, 1079-80 (1971).
99. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
100. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
101. See generally Sedler, supra note I; Sedler, Dombrowski in the Wake of Younger: The
View from Without and Within, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 1.
102. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
103. Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216'(1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S.
66 (1971).
104. See, e.g., National Student Ass'n v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
105. To say that the plaintiff must show that he would suffer irreparable injury if an injunc-
tion is not granted is merely the traditional way of saying that he must demonstrate the inadequacy
of other remedies in order to be entitled to affirmative equitable relief.
106. As one court has observed: "Subsequent case law weakened Mitchell as a precedent in
first amendment cases, since Mitchell was decided prior to judicial recognition of the so-called
,chilling effect' doctrine." National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Blount, 305 F. Supp. 546, 549
(D.I).C.). appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 801 (1970).
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tant step in the process of liberalizing standing requirements that ulti-
mately culminated in Data Processing and Barlow. Indeed, it is fair to
say that prior to those decisions, it was assumed that the requirements
of standing were lower in the first amendment area than in others.,"7 As
long as plaintiffs could show that their rights of expression somehow
would be "chilled" by the law or action they were challenging, they
could bring a Dombrowski-type suit-a shorthand way of saying that
they satisfied both the remedies test of irreparable injury and the judicial
review test of standing. Thus, in National Student Association v.
Hershey,' anti-war organizations acting on behalf of their members
were allowed to challenge the legality of the "Hershey Directive," which
prescribed the removal of draft deferments for registrants who had
engaged in illegal protest activity. Likewise, university students and
faculty have been allowed to challenge speaker ban laws,0 9 and the
courts have permitted public employees to challenge required loyalty
oaths before the enforcement of sanctions for noncompliance."
The limitations recently imposed upon the Dombrowski-type suit
deal primarily with its availability to enjoin pending criminal prosecu-
tions. In the one case dealing with relief against future enforcement,
Boyle v. Landry,"' the Court held that the mere allegation of a chilling
effect due to the facial invalidity of a law was insufficient to establish a
justiciable claim. This, however, does not affect the holdings in Hershey
and related cases that a demonstrable chilling effect is sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of irreparable injury and standing. Thus, when
a plaintiff establishes a "credible threat of enforcement and plausible
allegations of intent or desire to engage in the threatened activities,"" 2
he has alleged irreparable injury and has standing to challenge the valid-
ity of a law or other governmental action. The credible threat of enforce-
ment may be established either by past prosecutions of the plaintiff
under the law that he is challenging" 3 or by the fact that his activities
107. See, e.g., Reed Enterprises v. Corcoran, 354 F.2d 519, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ("Where
the plaintiff complains of chills and threats in the protected Fifth Amendment area, a court is more
disposed to find that he is presenting a real controversy").
108. 412 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
109. E.g., Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969); Snyder v. Board of
Trustees, 286 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. III. 1968); Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (N.D.N.C.
1968).
110. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
111. 401 U.S. 77 (1971).
112. National Students Ass'n v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
113. See, e.g., Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (W.D.N.C. 1971); Kirkwood v. Elling-
ton, 298 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. Tenn. 1969); University Comm. To End War in Vietnam v. Gunn,
289 F. Supp. 469 (W.D. Tex. 1968), appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 383 (1970); Hunter v. Allen, 286
F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Ga. 1968), affd, 422 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1970).
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are clearly subject to its prohibitions."'
A more difficult question is presented when the plaintiffs activities
are not expressly covered by the law in question, and the law has not
yet been invoked against him. Most laws that can be used to repress
freedom of expression are directed toward specific conduct rather than
toward categories of persons, groups, or activities. These laws are a
potent weapon in the hands of government officials, who can enforce
them against any person or group engaged in dissent. This is especially
true in the case of laws that are vague and overbroad. In this area the
chilling effect recognized in Dombrowski and the nexus criteria of
standing developed in Flast have become most significant. When a cred-
ible threat of enforcement has been made, it is possible to find a specific
chilling effect on the activities toward which the threat.is directed, and
the persons engaged in them feel the brunt of the chill. The nexus
between their status as participants in social change efforts and their
challenge of laws whose threatened enforcement chills such activities
gives them standing to seek judicial review." 5
C. Public Actions
In the public action a primary or major purpose of the suit is to
protect certain shared values that are allegedly infringed by the govern-
mental action which is being challenged. The violation of these values,
of course, may cause specific injury to certain individuals, but this is not
the principal reason such actions are instituted. The test case is perhaps
the most obvious example of a public action. Such actions are usually
a group effort, supported and financed by a number of concerned indi-
viduals or representative organizations.
As a part of the test case strategy an effort is made to find named
plaintiff who have a personal stake in the controversy, in order to over-
come any standing hurdle. Nevertheless, the degree of personal stake
114. See, e.g., Hull v. Petrillo, 439 F.2d 1184 (2d Cir. 1971); United Steelworkers v. Bage-
well, 383 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1967); National Ass'n of Theater Owners v. Motion Picture Comm'n,
328 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Gall v. Lawler, 322 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
115. See, e.g., Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Comm. v. Cahn, 437 F.2d 344 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied. 400 U.S. 956 (1970) (organization had standing to challenge state law under
which prosecution of persons wearing its emblem was threatened); Anderson v. Vaughn, 327 F.
Supp. 101 (D. Conn. 1971) (plaintiffs as members of group displaying Viet Cong flags had standing
to challenge "red-flag" statute under which fellow members of group were arrested); Straut v.
Calissi, 293 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.H. 1968) (anti-war organization had standing to challenge a state
law prohibiting opposition to the draft or war effort). But see Hendricks v. Hogan, 324 F. Supp.
1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (suit brought by plaintiffs who had exhibited at the same show out of which
flag desecration prosecutions arose dismissed on the ground that plaintiffs had not been threatened
with arrest).
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involved does not result in the case being handled any differently. Con-
sequently, it is difficult to believe that the Supreme Court really meant
what it said in Flast when it tried to make the distinction between a
"personal stake" and "generalized grievances" a factor in determining
whether the plaintiff would pursue the litigation with the "necessary
adverseness" and vigor."' To assume that cases are different in terms
of adverseness and vigor of pursuit is completely unrealistic.," There-
fore, it would seem that the justiciability of public actions should be
determined on the basis of the kind of challenges the Court is prepared
to hear-something akin to the political question doctrine."'
1. Abortion. -The lawyer handling a suit challenging an abortion
statute will argue that his plaintiffs have standing under conventional
notions, in an attempt to disguise the public nature of the suit. The
courts have responded in a similar vein by finding standing when any
personal interest can be shown. The "standard plan" in these suits is to
include as plaintiffs a physician, a pregnant woman desiring an abori-
ton, a woman seeking to avoid pregnancy, and other concerned profes-
sionals. In most cases standing has not been a problem, at least for the
treating physician and his patient."'
2. Reapportionment.-Standing, likewise, has not been a recog-
nizable problem in reapportionment cases. The crucial issue in Baker
116. 392 U.S. at 106.
117. See Davis, supra note 26, at 608-11; Jaffe, supra note 60, at 1037-38. If the suit were
collusive, of course, this would constitute an independent ground for dismissal.
118. Professor Jaffe has argued that the citizen or taxpayer should have standing to bring a
public action despite lack of any "personal interest." Jaffe, supra note 60, at 1043. He also
contends that the case and controversy provision does not require a Hohfeldian plaintiff. Jaffe,
Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REv. 633, 635 (1971); accord, 392 U.S. at 119-20 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement, 78
YALE L.J. 816 (1969). By citing these authorities in Sierra Club v. Morton, 40 U.S.L.W. 4397,
4399 n.3 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1972), the Supreme Court seemed to agree with them.
119. See Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121 (2d Cir. 1971); Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F.2d
833 (6th Cir. 1971); Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C. 1971); Steinberg v. Brown,
321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. I11. 1971); Doe v.
Dunbar, 320 F. Supp. 1297 (D. Colo. 1970); Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970),
prob.juris. noted, 402 U.S. 941 (1971) (only as to woman); Roe v. Wade, 314 1. Supp. 1217 (N.D.
Tex. 1970), prob. juris. noted, 402 U.S. 941 (1971). In Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Nelson, 327
F. Supp. 1290 (D. Ariz. 1971), the court dismissed a challenge by a physician, married couples,
and the Planned Parenthood Association on the following grounds: lack of standing, failure to show
"irreparable injury," and failure to exhaust state remedies. There was no pregnant woman plaintiff.
In Doe v. Randall, 314 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1970), affd sub nom., Hodgson v. Randall, 402
U.S. 967 (1971), the court held that the case was not justiciable because the physician who had
admittedly performed an abortion on the pregnant woman plaintiff had not been prosecuted. Even
if the physician had been prosecuted, however, the suit would be dismissed unless the plaintiff could
establish "irreparable injury" under the Younger criteria. See Babbitz v. McCann, 320 F. Supp.
219 (E.D. Wis. 1970), vacated, 402 U.S. 903 (1971).
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v. Carr,2 0 was whether the Court would continue to apply the political
question doctrine as a bar to justiciability. In subsequent reapportion-
ment cases any challenge to standing has been rejected summarily. 2'
The same principle has been applied broadly in actions affecting suf-
frage122 and the right to seek or hold a public office.'2
3. Racial Discrimination.-The courts have liberally interpreted
standing requirements in cases involving claims of racial discrimination.
Any black person has standing to challenge, on equal protection
grounds, a policy of legally required segregation in public facilities.
Moreover, in the area of school segregation parents of black children
attending public schools have been held to have standing to challenge
teacher assignment, 2 4 a state statute prohibiting the assignment of stu-
dents to prevent racial imbalance,121 and the tax-exempt status of pri-
vate, segregated schools. 26 On the other hand, in Whitley v. Wilson City
Board of Education, 27 white parents successfully challenged the alleg-
edly arbitrary assignment of their children to a predominately black
school on the ground that they were denied equal protection because the
school was not part of a unitary system. The same reasoning would
entitle white parents who wanted integrated schools to attack the failure
of a school board to establish a unitary system.
In addition to his right to seek judicial relief from government-
sanctioned racial discrimination in the area of education, a black person
who has been denied a governmental benefit or the opportunity to par-
120. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
121. See Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
122. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 428 (1965); Christopher v. Mitchell, 318 F. Supp. 994
(D.D.C. 1970); Mexican-Am. Fed'n-Wash. State v. Naff, 299 F. Supp. 587 (E.D. Wash. 1969),
vacated. 400 U.S. 986 (1971).
123. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 363 (1970); Shakman v. Democratic Organization, 435 F.2d
267 (7th Cir. 1970): Common Cause v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 333 F. Supp. 803 (D.D.C. 1971);
Jackson v. Ogilvie, 325 F. Supp. 864 (N.D. Ill.), affd, 403 U.S. 925 (1971); McCarley v. Sanders,
309 F. Supp. 8 (M.D. Ala. 1970); Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851 (W.D.N.Y. 1968), affd,
393 U.S. 405 (1969); cf Georgia Socialist Workers Party v. Fortson, 315 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D.
Ga. 1970), affd, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
124. Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198 (1965).
125. Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970).
126. Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970), affd, 400 U.S. 986 (1971). See
also McGlotten v. Connally, 40 U.S.L.W. 2465 (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 1972) (black who was allegedly
denied membership in a local Elks lodge successfully challenged the allowance of tax deductions
for contribution to and the tax exemption of fraternal orders that practice racial discrimination);
Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (black allegedly denied
membership in discriminatory organization and both black and white taxpayers not associated with
discriminatory organizations allowed standing to challenge property tax exemptions of such organ-
izations).
127. 427 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1970).
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ticipate in the governmental process because of race has standing to
challenge this discrimination. Thus, black citizens have been allowed to
seek affirmative relief against their exclusion from jury service.' More-
over, in Coleman v. Aycock, 2 1 a federal district court allowed black city
residents to challenge a number of discriminatory practices-including
segregation in the jails, hospitals, and cemeteries-without regard to
whether they personally had suffered discrimination with respect to such
facilities. Likewise, in Marable v. Alabama Mental Health Board,'
black mental patients were found to have standing to challenge discrimi-
natory hospital employment practices. There have been a few cases,
however, in which blacks who were not personally affected by the al-
leged discrimination were held to lack standing. In Brown v. Lutz, 3' a
black plaintiff who had no children in the public schools was denied
standing to challenge the actions of the board of education in providing
financial assistance, building space, and transportation to segregated
private schools. Furthermore, in Hadnott v. City of Prattville,," the
court held that black citizens who had not applied for municipal em-
ployment lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the municipal-
ity's employment discrimination.
33
The approach of the courts in these last cases ignores the essence
of a claim of racial discrimination. Societal discrimination against
blacks, the maintenance of governmentally sponsored segregation, and
the institutional racism that is so much a part of the American scene
cannot be broken down into individual parts. Since these practices have
relegated black persons to -second class citizenship, they should be able
to challenge governmentally imposed segregation and discrimination as
a class without having to show private injury. More realistically, this
means that civil rights groups should not have to find the right plaintiff
in order to launch an attack on governmental apartheid. All blacks have
an interest in ending racial discrimination and segregation, and to insist
on individual injury makes no sense whatsoever.
White citizens also should be able to assert their right to live in a
nonracist society. A white person who has been discriminated against
because of his association with blacks has standing to sdek relief under
128. Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
129. 304 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
130. 297 F. Supp. 291 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
131. 316 F. Supp. 1096 (E.D. La. 1970).
132. 309 F. Supp. 967 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
133. A rejected applicant, however, can maintain a discrimination suit as a class action. Penn
v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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applicable civil rights laws. 1 4 In the recent case of Trafficante v. Met-
ropolitan Life Insurance Co.,13 however, white tenants in an apartment
complex were held to lack standing to challenge its racially discrimina-
tory practices. The assumption upon which the court proceeded was that
the plaintiffs lacked standing because they were not injured by these
practices.' 31 This assumption begs the fundamental question why the
law prohibits racial discrimination. If our society is truly committed to
eliminating racism, then it would seem that any person, whether black
or white, desiring to live in a nonracist society should have standing to
compel obedience to the Constitution and laws that mandate racial
equality as an officially approved value. If the courts would recognize
the fact that such actions are public because of an underlying design to
implement officially approved values of racial equality, they would not
need to concern themselves with any question of standing.
17
4. Sex Discrimination.-If principles similar to those in the racial
discrimination area are applicable to sex discrimination, it would seem
that any woman should be able to bring a public action to challenge
institutional sexism. In Kirstein v. Rector & Visitors of University of
Virginia,38 four women brought suit in federal district court to compel
their admission to the University of Virginia at Charlottesville, thereby
attacking the state's policy of establishing all-female educational institu-
tions. The court begrudgingly 39 conceded that plaintiffs were entitled
to admission on "separate but equal grounds" since the female institu-
tions were not of comparable quality to the University.' Nevertheless,
it held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the legality of any
other state educational institution segregated as to sex on the ground
that they could suffer no harm from the operation of those institutions
which they did not wish to attend.' This reasoning is faulty because the
134. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park Lodge, 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
135. 446 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 33988 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1972)
(No. 708).
136. The court noted that under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970),
the Attorney General could bring a "pattern and practice" suit. It also observed that after the
instant action had been dismissed in the district court, individual blacks, "represented by the
counsel for the appellants here," brought suit against the defendant. 446 F.2d at 1162.
137. There is indeed a nexus between the plaintiffis status in this type of suit and the claim
he is asserting: as a person desiring to live in a nonracist society, he is asserting that the action
challenged perpetuates racism.
138. 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970).
139. It emphasized that the University was doing all it could and continually chided plaintiffs
for refusing to settle the case.
140. This places women in the position occupied by blacks under the doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The Supreme Court, however, has recently indicated its willingness
to move a bit farther toward invalidating sexually discriminatory classifications. Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971).
141. 309 F. Supp. at 188.
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existence of separate schools and other aspects of institutional sexism
is precisely what perpetuates sexual inequality. Perhaps, as the court
indicated, the broader issue had not been developed fully in the context
of the particular case,4 3 but that would have been an independent
ground for refusing to reach the question.
5. Church-State Separation. -In the area of separation of church
and state, Flast made possible use of the public action to challenge
federal expenditures as violative of the establishment clause of the first
amendment.'44 Although prior to Flast such actions were allowed with
respect to actual state and local expenditures,4 5 a plaintiff attacking
required Bible reading or school prayer had to establish a personal
"interest," such as parental status. 46 This approach was finally aban-
doned by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Allan v.
Hickel. 17 The court held that Flast and Data Processing, taken to-
gether, removed the requirement of pocketbook injury, thereby allowing
District of Columbia residents to challenge, on establishment grounds,
the inclusion of a creche in 'the National Park Service's Christmas
pageant.' Assuming this approach will be followed by other courts,
there would seem to be no significant limitations on the public action
as a vehicle for asserting first amendment rights.
6. Vietnam War.-Affirmative actions attempting to obtain a
judicial declaration concerning the legality of the Vietnam War often
have foundered on standing grounds. Citizen-taxpayers have been de-
nied standing on the ground that they were not basing their claim on a
specific limitation of the taxing and spending power,' and draft regis-
trants have fared no better.' 0 Similarly, those criminally prosecuted for
142. L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW 4 (1969).
143. 309 F. Supp. at 188.
144. Accord, Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 241 n.5 (1968) (school board's standing
to challenge a state law requiring them to furnish textbooks to parochial school students was not
questioned); Protestants & Other Americans United v. Watson, 407 F.2d 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(taxpayer had standing to bring suit challenging the issuance of a commemorative Christmas
stamp).
145. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
146. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9 (1963); Doremus v. Board of Educ.,
342 U.S. 429 (1952); Caldwell v. Craighead, 432 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970).
147. 424 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
148. The lower court recently held that inclusion of the creche did not violate the first
amendment because the total pageant was secular in nature. Allen v. Morton, 333 F. Supp. 1088
(D.D.C. 1971).
149. Pietsch v. President of United States, 434 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1970); Velvel v. Nixon,
415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970).
150. See Medeiros v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 198 (D. Mass. 1968).
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draft refusal have been unable to challenge the legality of the war, 51 and
this suggests that standing is not the principal reason for judicial reluct-
ance to reach the merits. The real issue, of course, is whether the legality
of the war comes within the political question doctrine. Most courts
have held that it does, and the Supreme Court has apparently ac-
quiesced in this view by its failure to grant certiorari in any of the
decided cases. The few courts holding that the question should be con-
sidered on the merits have had no difficulty in finding standing. In Berk
v. Laird,' for example, a private who had been ordered to Vietnam was
allowed to challenge the war's legality, 53 and in Mottola v. Nixon, 54
this holding was extended to reservists who might be called for service
in Vietnam. Moreover, although the court in Massachusetts v. Laird'55
refused to recognize any standing of the state to challenge the legality
of the war on behalf of its citizens, it did find standing on the part of
individual plaintiffs serving in Southeast Asia. 56 Finally, in Atlee v.
Laird,5 7 the court held that any citizen had standing to seek a deter-
mination of the war's constitutionality because of the impact that it
has had on American life. t58 These cases, as well as those denying
justiciability, indicate that the legality of the Vietnam War poses a
justiciability problem of the highest magnitude, but that the status of
the person raising the challenge is totally irrelevant.
7. Citizen's Suits.-A number of recent cases, whose clear pur-
pose was to test the validity of governmental action, point up the in-
creasing liberalization of standing requirements in the public action. In
one especially significant case, Reservists Committed to Stop the War
151. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 369 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
972 (1967).
152. 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970).
153. Although the court left open the issue whether the political question doctrine operated
as a bar, it refused to grant a preliminary injunction.
154. 318 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
155. 451 F.2d 26 (Ist Cir. 1971).
156. The Supreme Court, without comment and over the dissents of Justices Douglas, Stew-
art, and Harlan, refused to allow an original action by Massachusetts. Massachusetts v. Laird,
400 U.S. 886 (1970). The First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the political question doctrine
was not a bar to justiciability, but it concluded that the constitutional claim was without merit.
157. 40 U.S.L.W. 2660 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 1972).
158. The court observed that the loss of human resources reflected in the deaths of over
45,000 soldiers "provides a sufficient 'conservational' interest on the part of every citizen in saving
the human resources of this nation." 40 U.S.L.W. at 2661. It also noted that because the nation
was at war this "necessarily causes some threat to the personal safety and security of all the
citizens, given the complexity of international relationships and the advanced means of war that
have been developed through technology." Id. The citizen's interest in having the nation free from
any war except one declared by Congress was found to be within the zone of interests protected
by article I, § 8 of the Constitution.
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v. Laird,' former reservists were allowed as citizens to challenge the
eligibility of congressmen to hold reserve commissions in the Armed
Forces. The court specifically rejected plaintiffs' argument that as re-
servists they had suffered special injury due to favoritism shown con-
gressmen in promotions and assignments, and it further noted that this
alleged injury was not within the "zone of interests" which the constitu-
tional provision barring congressmen from appointment to "civil office
under the authority of the United States"'6 0 was designed to protect.
Likewise, plaintiffs had no standing as taxpayers, because the constitu-
tional provision upon which they relied could not be construed as a
limitation on the spending power. In the court's view, however, this was
a proper case for a citizen's suit. First, while any injury suffered as a
result of violation of the constitutional prohibition might have been
hypothetical, this hypothesis, according to the court, formed the basis
for the constitutional bar, which "addresses itself to the potential for
undue influence rather than to its realization."' 6 Secondly, the issue was
a narrow one involving a precise, self-operative provision of the Consti-
tution. Thirdly, the court said that all citizens share an "interest in
maintaining independence among the branches of government" which
constitutes "the primary if not the sole purpose of the bar against con-
gressmen holding executive office."'1 2 Finally, the court concluded that
the case did not involve a political question.
In Reservist's Committee the court clearly recognized the public
action concept'63 and, at the same time, pointed up the irrelevancy of
standing as a component in the question of justiciability. While plaintiffs
suffered no demonstrable special injury, the polity as a whole was dam-
aged by the constitutional violation. Consequently, a citizen was able
to bring suit to enforce the public interest. Although other justiciability
considerations might have rendered the suit inappropriate, those consid-
erations were not present because the case turned on a pure question of
law. Indeed, the court went out of its way to end the "standing game"
by making the following observation: "In recent years the Supreme
Court has greatly expanded the concept of standing and in this Circuit
the concept has now been almost completely abandoned.""'
159. 323 F. Supp. 833 (D.D.C. 1971).
160. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
161. 323 F. Supp. at 840.
162. Id. at 841.
163. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
164. 323 F. Supp. at 839. This was before the Supreme Court's decision in Sierra Club v.
Morton, 40 U.S.L.W. 4397 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1972), which held that failure to allege sufficient
personal injury was fatal to an organization plaintiff's environmental suit. Although it is uncertain
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Standing in citizen suits to protect consumer interests also has been
liberalized. In Nader v. Volpe,"6 5 for example, Ralph Nader was allowed
to challenge an extension of time given to a manufacturer for compli-
ance with safety standards established by the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act. 6' The court reasoned that allowing a manu-
facturer to place unsafe vehicles on the road conflicted with Nader's
duties as a member of the National Motor Vehicles Safety Advisory
Council and as a crusader for auto safety.
Citizen suits still occasionally founder on the standing bar. In
Richardson v. Kennedy, 6 7 a federal district court held that a citizen had
no standing to challenge the constitutionality of the congressional pay
raise effected by the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967.111
Surprisingly, in the recent case of Bradford v. Greene,'69 the District of
Columbia Circuit summarily affirmed a lower court decision denying
standing in a citizen's action to challenge the constitutionality of the
"no-knock" and preventive detention features of the District of Colum-
bia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970.170 Finally, in
Sharrow v. Brown,'7' a resident of New York who sought to enjoin
transmission of the results of the 1970 Census to the President on the
ground that the fourteenth amendment required the Director of the
Census to compile statistics on the number of disenfranchised voters in
each state, was held to lack standing because he had not proved that
enforcement of the constitutional mandate to reduce representation for
denial of suffrage172 would have increased New York's representation.
The results in these cases perhaps may be explained on grounds
other than standing. In Richardson, the substance of the plaintiff's
claim appeared questionable. If the claim were meritorious, the situa-
tion would not seem very different from that deemed appropriate for a
citizen's suit in Reservists Committee. The reluctance of the Bradford
whether in a case similar to Reservists Committee a court would now have to play the standing
game, it can be argued that every citizen suffers injury in fact from the action that was challenged
there.
165. 320 F. Supp. 266 (D.D.C. 1970).
166. 15 U.S.C. 1381-1431 (1970).
167. 313 F. Supp. 1282 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
168. 2 U.S.C. §§ 351-61 (1970).
169. 440 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
170. Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
171. 447 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1971).
172. The fourteenth amendment provides that when the right to vote has been abridged
"except for participation in rebellion or other crime," the basis of representation shall be reduced
in the proportion which the number of citizens disenfranchised bears to the total number of citizens
21 years of age or older.
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court to consider the constitutionality of controversial provisions of the
D.C. Crime Bill is clearly understandable. Evidently, the constitution-
ality of the statute was simply not a question that the court considered
appropriate for determination in a citizen suit, but rather it viewed the
issue as one requiring examination on a case-by-case basis with "live"
challengers. The situation presented in Sharrow is somewhat more diffi-
cult. It is quite obvious that the court did not want to deal with the
problem in the context of a challenge to the validity of the census.
Moreover, judicial enforcement of the second section of the fourteenth
amendment would have necessitated ordering executive officials to
make factual determinations in every state., The court was obviously
unwilling to withhold census results to accomplish that result.
IV. STANDING OF ORGANIZATIONS SEEKING To PROTECT
THE ENVIRONMENT
Organizational standing is often appropriate in both the private
and the public action. When there has been injury to the private interests
of a group of individuals, an organization representing them should have
standing to sue without requiring it to join designated individuals as
plaintiffs. Commercial organizations, for example, clearly have been
able to challenge action detrimental to their members.7 3 Likewise,
labor unions have been able to assert the rights of their members.," In
the public action, organizational standing is even more appropriate
since an organization usually supports and finances the suit. Moreover,
the possibility of extralegal pressures against designated plaintiffs in
controversial cases may make suit by an organization plaintiff a real
necessity. 75 Organizational standing has been recognized in public ac-
173. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 395 U.S. 976 (1969).
Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n v. Lowery, 452 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1971); National Automatic
Laundry Council v. Schultz, 443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971); National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v.
Motion Picture Comm'n, 328 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch,
307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970). See also Citizens Ass'n v. Simonson, 403 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969) (neighborhood association had standing to challenge the
issuance of a retail liquor license).
174. Lodge 1858, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Paine, 436 F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Armstead v. Municipal Separate School Dist.,
325 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Miss. 1971); National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Blount, 305 F. Supp.
546 (D.D.C. 1969), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 801 (1970). But see State Employees Ass'n v.
Natural Resources Bd., 298 F. Supp. 339 (W.D. Wis. 1969) (standing denied to union when an
individual employee joined as party plaintiff).
175. See Sedler, supra note 5, at 655.
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tions brought by religious, 76 civil rights, 77 antipoverty, 78 consumer-
protection, 79 and environmental groups; 80 but it also has been denied
in some cases,'8 ' including suits by a state on behalf of its citizens. 82
Since most of the significant recent cases dealing with organization
standing have involved suits by environmental groups seeking to enforce
environmental protection laws, the question of organization standing
will be discussed in this context.
An effort has been made in framing environmental suits to come
up with affected individuals and organizations as plaintiffs in order to
bring the case within traditional standing notions. In some cases, how-
ever, this has not been possible. These cases raise the fundamental
question whether concerned individuals and organizations have standing
in their own right to seek judicial protection of the environment. On the
whole, courts have been willing to find an "injury" and to sustain the
claim of standing. In Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal
Power Commission,83 an early case decided before Flast and Data
Processing, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a conserva-
tion group and towns within the area of Consolidated Edison's proposed
Storm King project had standing to seek review of the Federal Power
Commission's licensing order. The court found that because their activi-
ties and conduct had exhibited a special interest in the aesthetic, conser-
vational, and recreational aspects of power development in the area, the
plaintiffs were aggrieved parties within the meaning of the Federal
Power Act.8 4 Similarly, in Crowther v. Seaborg,18 5 a federal district
176. Protestants & Other Americans United v. United States, 435 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1970);
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Rockefeller, 322 F. Supp. 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
177. American Civil Liberties Union v. Albert Gallatin Area School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 637
(W.D. Pa. 1969).
178. National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
179. Federation of Homemakers v. Hardin, 328 F. Supp. 181 (D.D.C. 1971). But see
Rasmussen v. Hardin, 40 U.S.L.W. 2674 (9th Cir. Mar. 29, 1972) (consumer challenge to the
Secretary of Agriculture's milk marketing orders rejected on the ground that under the applicable
statute only milk handlers had standing to seek judicial review of such orders).
180. See notes 183-200 infra and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp. 35, 41 (E.D. Pa. 1960), rev'd on other
ground, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
182. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 40 U.S.L.W. 4246 (U.S. Mar. 1, 1972); South Carolina
v. Katzenbach. 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Rasmus-
sen v. United States, 421 F.2d 776 (8th Cir. 1970); Idaho ex rel. Robson v. First See. Bank, 315
F. Supp. 274 (D. Idaho 1970).
183. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
184. Id. at 616. The court also found economic injury upon which to base the plaintiffs'
standing since the organization had some trailways threatened by the project and the towns stood
to suffer interference with local planning and a decrease in tax revenues.
185. 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970).
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court recognized the standing of an organization "bringing a class ac-
tion on behalf of all persons entitled to the protection of their health
and the use and enjoyment of the natural resources of Colorado"'" 6 to
seek judicial review of proposed action by the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion in a project for the flaring of gas contained within a cavity created
by nuclear detonation.
Another recent example of organization standing to assert a public
interest is Citizens Committee for Hudson Valley v. Volpe,' which
involved a resident citizens' committee, the Sierra Club, and an affected
village who, because of their proximity to the project, were allowed to
challenge the Army Corps of Engineers' issuance of a permit to dredge
and fill the Hudson River for state expressway construction. A sufficient
special interest on the part of an organization plaintiff to challenge
authorization of mining and timber cutting activities in a national forest
under the National Environmental Policy Act of 196918 was found in
West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co."9 The
plaintiff was a membership corporation dedicated to preserving natural,
scenic, and historic areas in the West Virginia highlands. According to
the court, one of its main concerns was protection of an 18,000 acre area
within the affected national forest, which it had studied in detail and
where it had sponsored hikes. Other courts also have recognized stand-
ing based on an organization's special use of recreational areas.9 0
This judicial willingness to broaden standing to protect the environ-
ment may have received a setback by the recent decision of the Supreme
Court in Sierra Club v. Morton.'' The Court held, in a 4-3 decision,'
that the Sierra Club could not, without alleging some potential injury
to itself or its members, challenge approval by the Secretaries of Agri-
186. Id. at 1213.
187. 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
188. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970). It has been argued persuasively that this statute recog-
nizes a "judicially protectable environmental interest capable of being asserted by citizen groups."
Hanks & Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the National Environmen-
tal Polic' Act of 1969, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 230 (1970).
189. 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971).
190. Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alaska 1971); see Pennsylvania Envir.
Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970); cf Ely v. Velde, 321 F. Supp. 1088
(E.D. Va. 1971) (residents of "uniquely historical and architecturally significant" rural community
had standing to challenge state's construction of penal facility in area). But see South Hill Neigh-
borhood Ass'n v. Romney, 421 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1025 (1970)
(association whose purpose was the preservation of historic buildings did not have standing to
enjoin the demolition of historic buildings in an urban renewal area on the ground that HUD had
failed to comply with the provisions of the National Historic Preservation Act).
191. 40 U.S.L.W. 4397 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1972).
192. Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate in the decision.
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culture and Interior of a proposed all-year recreational project-to be
developed at Mineral King Valley in the Sequoia National Forest. The
opinion of Justice Stewart, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices
White and Marshall joined, squarely rejected the notion that the Sierra
Club could maintain the suit as a public action. Rather, it held that the
"injury in fact" test of Data Processing and Barlow "requires that the
party seeking review be himself among the injured." Justice Douglas,
dissenting, argued that environmental issues should be litigated "in the
name of the inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced or invaded
by roads and bulldozers," and that "[c]ontemporary public concern for
protecting nature's ecological equilibrium should lead to the conferral
of standing upon environmental objects to sue for their own preserva-
tion." 9 3 Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, argued for "an imaginative
expansion of our traditional concepts of standing in order to enable an
organization such as the Sierra Club, possessed as it is, of pertinent,
bona fide and well-recognized attributes and purposes in the area of
environment, to litigate environmental issues." '194 He was joined in this
view by Justice Brennan as well as Justice Douglas.
It is clear that the dissenters were motivated primarily by a concern
for environmental protection and that the majority was of the view that
this concern could be satisfied under the injury in fact test. The Court
invited the Sierra Club to amend its complaint to allege injury to itself
or its members and strongly intimated that the club's use of the affected
area would be sufficient to satisfy the injury in fact test. For this reason,
the Sierra decision should not be a significant roadblock to public ac-
tions to protect the environment. Some plausible interest on the part of
named individual or organizational plaintiffs will be necessary; but as
the previous examples indicate, this usually will not be difficult to dem-
onstrate.
Sierra may be contrasted with Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.
v. Hardin,"5 in which the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held
that five conservation organizations had standing to challenge the Secre-
tary of Agriculture's refusal to place an immediate ban on all uses of
DDT "' The court reasoned that those who might suffer harm from the
193. 40 U.S.L.W. at 4402.
194. Id. at 4406-07. Justice Blackmun proposed in the alternative that the judgment of the
District Court, which found standing and granted preliminary relief, be approved on condition that
the Sierra Club "amend its complaint to meet the specifications the Court prescribes for standing."
40 U.S.L.W. at 4406. Perhaps this statement reflects the "shared understanding" of the Court that
allegations regarding use of the affected area would be sufficient to confer standing.
195. 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
196. Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 135-(k)
(1970), the Secretary of Agriculture is required to prohibit the shipment in interstate commerce of
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consumption of pesticide residues, which the Secretary allegedly permit-
ted to collect in the environment, were affected by his action and that
their interest might properly be represented by a membership organiza-
tion with a demonstrated interest in preventing pesticide pollution. In
Sierra the Court cited Hardin for the proposition that an injury which
is widely shared could be sufficient to provide the basis for standing and
said that it had approved this development by noting in Data Processing
that the affected interest could reflect "aesthetic, conservational and
recreational values." 197 On the other hand, the Supreme Court criticized
the court in Hardin for suggesting that "an organizational interest in
the problem of environmental or consumer protection" was sufficient
to confer standing. 99 It then pointed out, however, that an organization
could sue on behalf of its members so long as some injury was shown.,
Since all persons suffer from pesticide pollution, it could be argued that
the organizations in Hardin were really suing on behalf of their mem-
bers and were protecting the members' personal interest in being free
from pesticide pollution. It would appear that the Court did not intend
to disapprove of the result in Hardin, but merely to bring it within the
injury in fact test.
In view of the past willingness of the lower federal courts to find
standing to protect the environment,2 0 and in view of the Supreme
any "economic poison" that cannot be rendered safe by labelling. The statute provides an elaborate
procedure for cancelling the registration of such products and also authorizes the Secretary to
suspend registration immediately if he finds such action "necessary to prevent an imminent hazard
to the public." Id. § 135(b). Plaintiffs in the instant case filed a petition with the Secretary
requesting that he issue notices of cancellation for all products containing DDT and for the
immediate suspension of their registration. The Secretary issued notices of cancellation with re-
spect to 4 uses of DDT, solicited comments concerning the remaining uses, and took no action on
the request for interim suspension.
197. 40 U.S.L.W. at 4401.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. For other cases in which organizational standing has been recognized see Upper Pecos
Ass'n v. Stans, 425 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1971); Cape May County Chapter, Inc. v. Macchia, 329
F. Supp. 504 (D.N.J. 1971); Honchok v. Hardin, 326 F. Supp. 988 (D. Md. 1971); Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 324 F. Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1971); Izaak Walton League
v. St. Clair, 313 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Minn. 1970). In most, if not all, of these cases the necessary
injury in fact probably could have been established. Until the Supreme Court's decision in Sierra,
other reasons than the organization's failure to allege sufficient injury to itself were given for its
inability to maintain the suit. South Hill Neighborhood Ass'n v. Romney, 421 F.2d 454 (6th Cir.
1969) (plaintiffs had not engaged sufficiently in administrative process to indicate they are a
representative association); National Audubon Soc'y v. Johnson, 317 F. Supp. 1330 (S.D. Tex.
1970) (state was a necessary party, and plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies); Kent
County Council for Historic Preservation v. Romney, 304 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Mich. 1969) (no
violation of statute); cf. Lamm v. Volpe, 449 F.2d 1202 (10th Cir. 1971) (action by plaintiff as
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Court's apparently broad interpretation of injury in fact in Sierra, it is
unlikely that Sierra will be interpreted as a signal to pull back. Rather,
the courts will insist that environmental organizations play the game by
alleging some injury in fact to themselves or their members from the
action they are challenging. If this prediction is accurate, the practical
impact of Sierra will not be great.
V. CONCLUSION
Recognizing that federal courts should not always be available to
allow citizens to air generalized grievances about the conduct of govern-
ment, and that certain limitations on the exercise of federal judicial
power are necessary and desirable, how are these limitations to be deter-
mined? The behavioral analysis of courts as institutions that I have
attempted in this article leads me to conclude that the concept of stand-
ing is of no real help and may be a positive hindrance. Moreover, the
other components of justiciability-the political question doctrine, ripe-
ness, mootness, and nonreviewability of administrative action-are far
more functional ways of dealing with the matter of limitations- on fed-
eral judicial power.
The Supreme Court has gone very far toward eliminating standing
as a limitation on judicial review, and the institutional behavior of the
courts following the most recent Supreme Court expositions in Data
Processing and Barlow has indicated that the concept is of little real
signifiance. In practice the Court's "two-pronged" test has become
"one-pronged" because a plaintiff who establishes injury in fact, also
will satisfy the zone of interests test in either the private or public action.
The only utility of standing in the private action is to justify a dismissal
in those rare cases in which the plaintiff has no interest whatsoever, and
such a case can be dismissed under traditional remedies principles."0 '
The real issue today involves the public action. Often it will be
possible to find a plaintiff who satisfies the injury in fact test; and the
Supreme Court's decision in Sierra makes it clear that it will be neces-
sary to do so, at least for the foreseeable future."' Unfortunately, the
individual, citizen, taxpayer, and legislator challenging constitutionality of federal act regulating
outdoor advertising as a usurpation of police power reserved to state, rendered moot by legisla-
ture's enactment of just compensation statute in compliance with the federal act).
201. When the plaintiff has suffered no injury from the action he is challenging or none is
threatened, he would be unable to maintain the suit due to an absence of irreparable injury. See
H. McCLINTOCK, EQUITY 449-50 (2d ed. 1948).
202. In effect, the Court accepted the view of Professor Davis that a "trifling interest" is
required for standing. See Davis, supra note 26, at 613, 630-33. A contrary view, espoused by
1972]
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standing game still has to be played. It is submitted that this is undesira-
ble. When a concerned citizen or group seeks to challenge the validity
of governmental action, the challenge should not be rejected because of
lack of interest. The proper role of the federal courts vis-a-vis the states
and other agencies of the federal government can be delineated with
reference to the other components of justiciability. To the extent that
public actions would involve the courts in the determination of political
questions, or would raise questions that are not yet ripe for decision or
capable of resolution in an affirmative suit, or would invade what is
properly the restricted domain of administrative agencies, they could be
rejected on those grounds. Looking to the behavior of the courts in
actual cases, the concept of standing has generally not operated as a bar
to bringing meritorious-and sometimes not so meritorious-suits. Nor
it is likely to operate as a bar after Sierra. It has merely caused a great
deal of confusion, necessitated the expenditure.of a large amount of time
and effort both by the judiciary and by counsel, sometimes masked the
real reasons for decisions, and occasionally produced unsound results.
It is time to abandon it once and for all.
Professor Jaffe, is that a court may in its discretion allow a citizen to maintain a suit as a public
action if it believes that review of the legal questions raised is in the public interest. See L. JAFFE,
supra note 59, at 475-97. This appears to have been the position of the dissent in Sierra.
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